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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(k) (Supp. 1993).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was it clearly erroneous for the trial court to

conclude, based on the evidence presented at trial and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that Dr. Wilde followed an
appropriate and acceptable standard of care within the specialty
of obstetrics during his examination and treatment of
Mrs. Rivera?
2.

Was it clearly erroneous for the trial court to rely

upon expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of
care practiced by competent and qualified obstetricians in this
and similar communities and to refuse to create a different
standard as a matter of law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for the trial courts Findings of
Fact is:
This court gives deference to the trial
court's findings of fact and we will not set
them aside unless we find them to be clearly
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Under
this standard, we will not disturb factual
findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made (citation omitted).
Reliance

Ins.

Co. v. Utah Dept.

of Transportation,

Rpt. 14 (Utah App. 1993).

- 1 -

219 Utah Adv.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules and regulations, with the exception of
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding the standard
of review, are not thought to be determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in Court Below.

This is a medical malpractice action concerning the
obstetrical care the Appellee, Clayton S. Wilde, M.D.
("Dr. Wilde"), provided to the Appellant, Brenda Rivera
("Mrs. Rivera"), during her pregnancy in 1989. Mrs. Rivera
claims that Dr. Wilde negligently failed to diagnose preeclampsia, which is a hypertensive disorder of pregnancy.
Dr. Wilde maintains that Mrs. Rivera was not pre-eclamptic when
he last examined her and that his care was entirely appropriate.
The case proceeded to trial in the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, without
a jury.

After hearing all of the evidence, Judge Murphy

concluded that Mrs. Rivera had failed to carry the burden of
proof to establish a claim for medical malpractice against
Dr. Wilde, and that the more credible evidence received convinced
the Court that Dr. Wilde clearly complied with an appropriate and
acceptable standard of care during his treatment of Mrs. Rivera.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on June 3,
1993.
- 2 -

B.

Statement of Facts.

Mrs. Rivera's first pre-natal visit with Dr. Wilde was on
March 1, 1989.

During that visit, Dr. Wilde took Mrs. Rivera's

medical and family history, and he performed a physical
examination.

[Findings of Fact, f 2.]

The examination revealed

that Mrs. Rivera was a healthy 25-year-old woman with below
average mental ability who was pregnant for the first time.
Mrs. Rivera weighed 157 pounds and her blood pressure was 98/64.
[Id.]

Based on the information Dr. Wilde collected during this

visit, he concluded that Mrs. Rivera was a low-risk obstetrical
patient and estimated that the date of delivery would be
September 17, 1989.

[Id.]

Dr. Wilde then told Mrs. Rivera and

her husband what they could expect during the pregnancy.

[Id.]

At the end of the visit, Dr. Wilde assured the Riveras that they
could, and should, call him anytime they had any concerns,
questions or problems.

[Id.]

Dr. Wilde encourages all his

patients to call him with their concerns.

[Dr. Wilde, R. 1288 -

89.]
Dr. Wilde saw Mrs. Rivera monthly for routine pre-natal care
during her pregnancy.

[Findings of Fact, f 3.]

Beginning early

in the pregnancy, Mrs. Rivera often complained to Dr. Wilde about
headaches, which were relieved with Tylenol, and nausea and
vomiting.

[Id.]

These symptoms are common during pregnancy and

Dr. Wilde reassured Mrs. Rivera and her husband that she should
soon begin to feel better.

[Id.]

Mrs. Rivera had uneventful and

- 3 -

routine pre-natal visits with Dr. Wilde on April 24 and May 22,
[Id.]

1989.

On June 12, 1989, Mrs. Rivera's husband spoke with
Dr. Wilde's nurse by telephone.

[Id.

at J 4.]

He reported that

Mrs. Rivera's feet and legs became swollen after she worked all
day as a custodian at the University Hospital.

[Id.]

The nurse

asked Mr. Rivera whether Mrs. Rivera had any other complaints.
None were reported.

[Id.]

The nurse recommended that

Mrs. Rivera elevate her legs as much as possible and increase her
[Id.]

water intake.

The nurse said that Mrs. Rivera should come

to the office before her next scheduled visit if her condition
[Id.]

worsened.

Mrs. Rivera did not return to Dr. Wilde's

office until her next scheduled visit.

[Id.

at f 5.]

Mrs. Rivera's next and final visit took place on June 15,
1989.

[Id.]

On that day, she weighed 181 pounds, her fetus was

26 weeks old, and her blood pressure measured 110/88.
55 2, 5.]

[Id.

at

Mrs. Rivera repeated her complaints of having

headaches, which were still relieved with Tylenol, and some
nausea and vomiting.
fatigue.

[Id.]

[Id.

at 5 6.]

She also complained of some

Based on these complaints and her blood

pressure, Dr. Wilde considered the possibility that Mrs. Rivera
might have pre-eclampsia, and he began to examine her
accordingly.

[Id.

at 55 12, 6.]

He checked her blood pressure

and found it to be 110/84.

He checked her urine for the presence

of protein and found none.

[Id.

at 5 5.]

He then re-checked the

urine specimen to confirm the absence of protein.
- 4 -

[Id.]

At the

request of Mrs. Rivera's husband, Dr. Wilde carefully looked for
pathologic edema in Mrs. Rivera's feet, ankles, legs and face,
and he found none.

[Id.

at f 6.]

The amount of weight gain

Mrs. Rivera had experienced was not unusual.

[Id.

at f 12.]

Her

symptoms of headache, nausea and vomiting were not caused by preeclampsia or developing preeclampsia.

[Id.]

Furthermore, there

was nothing in Mrs. Rivera's medical or family history, course of
pregnancy, complaints, or examination and test findings which was
diagnostic of pre-eclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia.

[Id.]

To the contrary, these symptoms were consistent with a flu-like
illness that many of Dr. Wilde's patients had recently reported.
[Jd.]

Mrs. Rivera's blood pressure was taken a third time and

was found to be 110/80.

[Jd. at 5 6.]

At the conclusion of the June 15, 1989 visit, Dr. Wilde
instructed Mrs. Rivera to take care of herself by taking breaks
and elevating her feet at work, and by resting and keeping off
her feet when at home.

[Id.]

As an additional precaution,

Dr. Wilde asked Mrs. Rivera to come back for another pre-natal
visit in two weeks, rather than at the regular interval of one
month.

[Id.]

He also told Mrs. Rivera to come in for another

check up in a few days if she was not feeling better by then.
[Jd. at 5 6.]

Mrs. Rivera did not return to Dr. Wilde's office.

[Jd. at f 7.]

On June 23, 1989, Mrs. Rivera experienced an

eclamptic seizure.

[Jd.]

The expert testimony and medical literature presented at
trial established that Dr. Wilde's treatment of Mrs. Rivera
- 5 -

complied with an accepted school of thought which is within the
standard of care.

[Id.

at 5 9.]

Although there is no uniform

standard of care concerning the criteria for diagnosing
pre-eclampsia [Id.],

it is clearly within an acceptable school of

thought to define pre-eclampsia as a blood pressure of 140/90 or
greater in the presence of proteinuria (protein in the urine).
Swelling or edema, even of the face and hands, and weight gain
are so common in pregnancy that they are useless for the
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia.

[Id.

at f 10.]

Pre-eclampsia is frequently insidious in its onset and can
progress to eclampsia very quickly.

[Dr. Wilde, R. 1253;

Dr. Farnsworth, R. 1116; Dr. Wade, R. 862.]

In fact, patients

can develop eclamptic seizures without ever manifesting any signs
of pre-eclampsia.

[Dr. Farnsworth, R. 1116; Dr. Wade, R. 862.]

Obviously, the fact that Mrs. Rivera suffered an eclamptic
seizure does not imply that she received substandard care.
[Dr. Wilde R. 1253; Dr. Farnsworth R. 1116].
The school of thought Dr. Wilde followed in evaluating
Mrs. Rivera for pre-eclampsia is the standard recommended and
used by the majority of competent and qualified obstetricians and
is well-supported in the medical literature.

[Id.

at f 11.]

Further, the standard of care did not require Dr. Wilde to take
any additional action or to have Mrs. Rivera return sooner than
two weeks.

[Id.

at f 13.]

The trial court found that

Mrs. Rivera failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence with credible expert testimony that the school of
- 6 -

thought Dr. Wilde followed was insufficient or unsafe.

[Id.

at

II 11.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
The trial court 7 s Findings of Fact should be affirmed
because Mrs. Rivera failed to marshal all of the evidence
supporting the trial court's Findings and, in any event, the
evidence clearly supports all of the trial court's Findings.

The

Appellant's argument that the trial court was required to ignore
a well-established standard of care developed by exhaustive
medical research and practice is contrary to the established law
of Utah, and elsewhere, and to sound public and judicial policy.
Moreover, there is no basis in this record to conclude that the
standard of care Dr. Wilde followed is unsafe or that some other
standard is more appropriate.

For these reasons, the judgment

below should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD BECAUSE
MRS. RIVERA HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS AND BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AMPLY
SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDINGS.
In attacking the trial court's Findings of Fact, Mrs. Rivera
bears the burden of first marshaling all of the evidence in
support of those Findings and then demonstrating that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the Findings against attack under the
clearly erroneous standard described in Rule 52(a) of the Utah

- 7 -

Rules of Civil Procedure.
Covey

& Co.,

As this Court explained in Slattery

v.

Inc.:

An appellant challenging factual findings
faces a substantial burden. Trial court's
findings of fact will be affirmed if they are
x
based on sufficient evidence, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court's construction.' West
Valley
City

v.

Majestic

Inv.

Co.,

818 P.2d 1311,

1313 (Utah App. 1991). In order to prevail,
"the challenging party must marshal all
relevant evidence presented at trial which
tends to support the findings." Id.
That
party must then show that the same findings
are "so lacking in support as to be xagainst
the clear weight of the evidence,' thus
making them clearly erroneous." Id. at 1315.
Slattery
1993).

v. Covey & Co.,
See also,

1993); Reid

v.

Reinbold

Mutual

901 (Utah 1989).

Inc.,

of

216 Utah Adv. Rpt. 26 (Utah App.

v. Utah,

850 P.2d 487 (Utah App.

Omaha Insurance

Co.,

776 P.2d 896, 899 -

Under this standard, this Court will "review

the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
findings and affirm if there is a reasonable basis for doing so."
Reinbold,

supra

(citing

(Utah App. 1987), cert,

Gillmor

v.

Gillmor,

denied,

765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988)).

745 P.2d 461, 462

The marshaling requirement fulfills an important function
when findings of fact are challenged, as in this case, following
a lengthy and technically challenging trial. As this Court
stated in Robb v. Anderton,

225 Utah Adv. Rpt. 22 (Utah App.

1993) :
The marshaling requirement provides the
appellate court the basis from which to
conduct a meaningful and expedient review of
facts challenged on appeal. See, Wright
v.
Westside
Nursery,
787 P.2d 508, 512 Note 2
(Utah App. 1990).
- 8 -

225 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 25. Thus, in determining whether the
Appellant has fulfilled the marshaling requirement, the Court
should determine whether or not it is able to conduct a
"meaningful and expedient review of the facts" favorable to the
trial court's finding.

When an appellant argues only selected

evidence favorable to its position without presenting the
evidence supporting the trial court's finding, this Court will
affirm the finding.

Id.

This Court, moreover, will not even examine whether a trial
court's findings are clearly erroneous unless the appellant has
met the threshold requirement of marshaling all the evidence that
supports the trial court's findings. As this Court has stated:
We have shown no reluctance to affirm when
the appellant fails to adequately marshal the
evidence. West Valley City, supra
(citing
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah App.
1990); Turnbaugh

v. Anderson,

793 P.2d 939

(Utah App. 1990) .
West Valley

City

v. Majestic

Inv.

Co.,

818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah

App. 1991).
In this case, the Appellant has made no effort to marshal
the evidence which supports the specific findings she challenges.
The Appellant claims there is insufficient evidence to support
the Findings 10, 11, 12 and 14.

[Appellant's Brief p. 15]. In

order to conduct a "meaningful and expedient review of the facts"
favorable to these findings, this Court needs to have separately
set forth all of the evidence supporting each specific finding.
Robb v. Anderton,

supra

at 25. No effort has been made to do so

and thus, the Court does not have presented to it the information
- 9 -

it needs to facilitate its review.
should be affirmed.

Consequently, the Findings

Id.

Despite this failure to marshal the evidence, if the
individual Findings under attack are examined in light of the
evidence at trial, the Court will find abundant support for the
trial court's conclusions.

In Finding No. 10, the Court found:

Based upon the expert testimony and the
medical literature presented, the Court finds
that Defendant's treatment of Plaintiff
complied with an accepted school of thought
which is within the standard of care. It was
appropriate for Defendant to adopt and adhere
to the school of thought that: (1) defines
pre-eclampsia as a blood pressure of equal to
or greater than 140/90 in the presence of
proteinuria; and (2) considers edema (even of
the face and hands) and weight gain so common
in pregnancy that they are useless for the
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia.
The standard of care Dr. Wilde followed for diagnosing preeclampsia was clearly established at trial by both expert
testimony and authoritative medical literature.

Dr. Wilde

testified as an expert witness on his own behalf.
qualified to do so.

He was well-

He is a board certified obstetrician/

gynecologist who was the Chief of the Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology at St. Mark's Hospital when he treated
Mrs. Rivera.

[Dr. Wilde R. 1246 - 47.]

At that time he

testified he was President of the Medical Staff at his hospital
and held a leadership position in the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists.

[Dr. Wilde R. 1247 - 48.]

Dr. Wilde is also a Clinical Assistant Professor of Obstetrics
and Gynecology at the University College of Medicine and taught
- 10 -

courses on the subject of pre-eclampsia,
49.]

[Dr. Wilde R. 1248 -

Dr. Wilde testified that the diagnosis of pre-eclampsia is

dependent on two issues:

(1) the patient first must have

persistent hypertension, defined as a blood pressure of at least
140/90; and (2) the patient must also have evidence of
proteinuria.

[Dr. Wilde R. 1253 - 54.]

Dr. Wilde also

testified:
Q.
Okay, is your clinical definition of —
your criteria for diagnosing pre-eclampsia
recognized by respected and competent
obstetricians as an appropriate standard in
this and similar communities?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Do you have an opinion as to whether or
not it is the majority opinion among
clinicians in this and other communities?
A.

I would say the vast majority.

[Dr. Wilde R. 1253 - 54.]
Dr. Wilde also testified that edema and weight gain are so
common in pregnancy that they are useless for the diagnosis of
pre-eclampsia.

Edema occurs in 80% of all pregnancies and excess

weight gain is common in normal pregnancies.
1265.]

[Dr. Wilde R.

Edema of the face and hands occurred among 64% of women

in one study and 3 0% of women studied in the Collaborative
Perinatal Project involving 39,000 women.

[Dr. Wilde R. 1265 -

66. ]
Dr. Wilde also presented expert testimony from Kent
Farnsworth, M.D., a board certified obstetrician/gynecologist who
practices at LDS Hospital, Holy Cross Hospital, University
- 11 -

Hospital and Cottonwood Hospital.

[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1111 - 12.]

Dr. Farnsworth is also a Clinical Associate Professor in the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Utah
School of Medicine.
month.

On average he delivers 25 babies every

[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1113.] Among the 4,500 patients he

has delivered, Dr. Farnsworth has diagnosed and treated hundreds
of patients with pre-eclampsia.

[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1113 - 14.]

The criteria for diagnosing pre-eclampsia in Dr. Farnsworth's
practice are a blood pressure of at least 140/90 and proteinuria,
which are also the diagnostic criteria that comprise the accepted
standard of care for obstetricians in this and similar
communities.

[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1116 - 17.]

Dr. Farnsworth also

agrees that edema and weight gain are so common that they are not
helpful in diagnosing pre-eclampsia.

[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1118 -

19.]
Although the Appellant neglected to mention it when she
marshaled the evidence, the testimony of her own expert witness
supports the trial court's finding.

Dr. Maclyn Wade acknowledged

that Dr. Wilde's definition of hypertension is consistent with an
accepted school of thought which is within the standard of care.
[Dr. Wade R. 1034.]

Similarly, he agreed that schools of thought

accepted within the standard of care regard edema, even of the
hands and face, and weight gain to be insignificant in the
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia.

[Dr. Wade R. 1041, 1044.]

The Appellant also neglected to cite to this Court the many
references from authoritative medical literature supporting the
- 12 -

standard of care Dr. Wilde followed in this case.

We will not

assume that burden here except to mention two notable
authorities.

Williams Obstetrics, one of the world's most widely

used and cited medical references in obstetrics, specifically
recommends the exact diagnostic criteria for pre-eclampsia that
Dr. Wilde uses.

It also specifically rejects the school of

thought the Appellant urges because those criteria have "little
clinical value."

[Dr. Wilde R. 1256 - 57.]

No less an authority

than the World Health Organization also agrees with this view.
Following an exhaustive research effort, it defined pre-eclampsia
for the purposes of diagnosis as prolonged persistent diastolic
readings of 90 or higher in the presence of proteinuria.

In so

doing, the World Health Organization specifically rejected
inclusion of edema, weight gain and other factors, including
incremental blood pressure changes, as a part of that definition.
[Dr. Wilde R. 1271.]
The Court's Finding No. 11 was as follows:
The school of thought Defendant followed in
his diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff is
well supported in the medical literature and
by competent and qualified experts as an
approved method of diagnosis and treatment
recommended and followed by a respectable
portion of the medical community in the
specialty of obstetrics and gynecology. The
Plaintiff has not demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence with credible
expert testimony that the school of thought
the Defendant followed is unaccepted,
insufficient or unsafe.
Obviously, the evidence introduced at trial which supports
Finding No. 10 also substantiates Finding No. 11. With respect
- 13 -

to what expert testimony at trial was "credible," this Court is
guided by the principal that "due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Robb v. Anderton,

supra

at

25.
The only expert witness who questioned the school of thought
the majority of obstetricians throughout the country advocates
was the Appellant's expert witness, Dr. Maclyn Wade.

The trial

court was rightfully unimpressed with Dr. Wade, finding:
The Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Maclyn Wade, had
limited obstetrical experience and his
testimony was equivocal, unpersuasive and
lacking in credibility. Dr. Wade gave away
on cross-examination most of the points he
made on direct and re-direct examination.
[Finding No. 8.]

The Appellant does not challenge this Finding

and for good reasons.

[Appellant's Brief p. 15.]

Dr. Wade had

limited obstetrical experience throughout his career, delivering
only one or two babies a month.

[Dr. Wade R. 1028.]

abandoned obstetrics entirely in 1989.

He

[Dr. Wade R. 1024.]

While in private practice, his total experience with preeclampsia was limited to a dozen or two patients, all of whom he
referred to others for treatment.

[Dr. Wade R. 1031, 1029.]

He

is, however, well-traveled as an expert witness having testified
in 60 trials, 1,500 depositions and having made hundreds of
thousands of dollars as a hired expert.

[Dr. Wade R. 1023 - 24.]

His credibility was further cast in doubt when it was revealed
that three articles he claimed to have authored and published in
the medical literature do not exist.
- 14 -

[Dr. Wade R. 1013 - 21.]

Dr. Farnsworth, who had never previously testified as an
expert witness and whose clinical obstetrical practice is one of
Utah/s largest, was far more credible.
1113.]

[Dr. Farnsworth R. Ill,

Dr. Farnsworth was specifically asked whether or not the

diagnostic criteria for pre-eclampsia consisting of hypertension
of 140/90 in the presence of proteinuria is a "dangerous
standard" and he responded, "No, I don't think so."
[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1156.]

The fact that a vast majority of

competent and qualified obstetricians in this and similar
communities, a large number of obstetrical researchers writing on
the subject, and the World Health Organization all support and
use this same standard is compelling evidence supporting the
trial court's Finding that the standard of care Dr. Wilde
employed is clearly accepted, sufficient and safe.
The Court's Finding No. 12 was as follows:
During Defendant's examination and evaluation
of Plaintiff on June 15, 1989, the
possibility of pre-eclampsia was raised, but
there was nothing in Plaintiff's medical or
family history, course of pregnancy,
complaints, or examination and test findings
which was diagnostic of pre-eclampsia or
developing pre-eclampsia. To the contrary,
Plaintiff did not have hypertension or
proteinuria. Her symptoms of headache,
nausea and vomiting were not caused by preeclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia. The
amount of edema and weight gain observed was
not unusual. Moreover, the risk of preeclampsia and/or eclampsia is extremely low
in gravid patients at 2 6 weeks gestational
age.
Dr. Farnsworth's testimony specifically addresses and supports
the trial court's Finding.

Dr. Farnsworth testified as follows:
- 15 -

Q.
Her blood pressure when she came in was
110 over 88?
A.

Yes.

Q.
She had weight gain of —
said eight pounds?

I believe we

A.

Eight pounds, yes.

Q.

And she had edema of her feet?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall that complaint?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And no proteinuria?

A.

That's correct.

Q.
Okay. Would those features, either
individually or as a constellation, cause you
to suspect that she was at risk for
developing an eclamptic seizure prior to 30
weeks?
A.

No.

Q.
Would you give us your opinion as to the
appropriate action within the standard of
care in addressing that constellation of
symptoms of Dr. Wilde's [patient]?
A.
Well, as I reviewed the case it appears
to me that his response was appropriate.
From reading the record, he examined the
patient closely, his record indicates that he
was concerned about the possibility of facial
edema. He was concerned about the
possibility of proteinuria. He doublechecked her urine to be sure there was no
evidence of proteinuria. And probably —
most probably he checked her blood pressure.
Yes, on two subsequent occasions. The
first subsequent the diastolic was 80 and the
second one was 84. And then they spent some
time with the patient. His report indicates
that he told the patient that she should get
lots of rest, or lots of down time. And he
- 16 -

reiterated, as I do in my practice, to the
patient, if you have any questions or
concerns or anything that develops that to
you seems different, I'm here and available.
You can call me any time, and I would want to
see you.
I think for the presentation of symptoms
at that point, that's within the standard of
care in this community for surveillance of
the patient.
Q.

And in similar communities?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Should Dr. Wilde have diagnosed
Mrs. Rivera as being preeclamptic on the 15th
of June?
A.
I would not find any criteria for that
diagnosis.
[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1125 - 26.]
Even the Appellant's own expert concurs that Mrs. Rivera's
symptoms of headache, nausea and vomiting were not caused by preeclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia.

[Dr. Wade R. 1047 - 48.]

Dr. Farnsworth and Dr. Wade also agree that the risk of preeclampsia and/or eclampsia is extremely low at 2 6 weeks of
pregnancy.

[Dr. Wade R. 1032; Dr. Farnsworth R. 1124.]

The evidence in support of the Court's Finding No. 14 that
Dr. Wilde clearly complied with an applicable and acceptable
standard of medical care is extensive, authoritative and
compelling.

Ample citations to the record have already been

discussed and further elaboration would be redundant.
Rather than marshalling the evidence as she is required to
do, the Appellant has simply reasserted the same arguments and
evidence the trial court found to be unpersuasive and unreliable.
- 17 -

It is abundantly clear that each and every Finding of the trial
court challenged on this appeal is fully supported by competent
and authoritative evidence.

Accordingly, this Court should

affirm the Findings of the Court below and its Judgment in favor
of Dr. Wilde.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RELIED UPON EXPERT TESTIMONY
TO ESTABLISH THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE AND
PROPERLY REFUSED TO CREATE A DIFFERENT STANDARD AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The trial court applied the following legal standard to the
evidence presented:
In order to recover upon a claim of medical
malpractice, Plaintiff has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that Defendant deviated from the standard of
care applicable to physicians specializing in
obstetrics and gynecology practicing in Salt
Lake City, Utah, or similar communities, in
1989, and that said deviation from the
standard of care was a proximate cause of the
injuries and damages claimed by Plaintiff.
[Conclusions of Law, f 1.]
established Utah law.

This standard comports with firmly

See, King

v.

Searle

P.2d 858, 862-63 (Utah 1992); Butterfield
102 (Utah 1992); Dalley

v.

Utah Valley

P.2d 193, 195-96 (Utah 1990); Nixdorf

Pharmaceuticals,

v. Okubo,
Regional

351-52 (Utah 1980); Kim v. Anderson,

831 P.2d 97,

Medical

v. Hicken,

832

Ctr.,

791

612 P.2d 348,

610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah

1980); Marsh v. PemJberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, 1100-11
(1959), overruled

on other

grounds,

(Utah 1978); Huggins

v. Hicken,

525-26 (Utah 1957).

State

Swan v.

Lamb,

584 P.2d 814

6 Utah 2d 233, 238, 310 P.2d 523,

v. Warden,
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784 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Utah

App. 1989); Chadwick
1988); Hoopiiaiana

v.
v.

Nielsen,

763 P.2d 817, 821-22 (Utah App.

Intermountain

Health

270, 271 (Utah App. 1987); Martin
(Utah App. 1987); Robinson

v.

v.

Mott,

Care,

740 P.2d

744 P.2d 337, 338

Intermountain

Health

740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987); Virginia
Ctr.,

Inc.,

S.

v.

Care,

Inc.,

Salt

Lake

Care

741 P.2d 969, 970 (Utah App. 1987).
It is equally well-established in the State of Utah that,

with few exceptions, expert testimony is required to establish
the standard of care by which a physician's conduct is to be
Arnold

measured.
Searle

v.

Curtis,

Pharmaceuticals,

Butterfield
Stoker,

v.

846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1992); King

Inc.,

Okubo,

832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992);

831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Jennings

652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982); Nixdorf

Hicken,

Huggins

310 P.2d 523 (Utah 1957); Robb v.

347 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1959);

225 Utah Adv. Rpt. 222 (Utah App. 1993); Anton
P.2d 744 (Utah App. 1991); George
(Utah App. 1990); Butterfield
1990), rev'd
Gold

Cross

on other
Service,

Inc.,

v. Geigy

Pharmaceutical

Chadwick

v.

Nielsen,

Lake

Care

v.

Salt

Hoopiiaiana

v.

1987); Robinson

v.

v.

Thomas,

LDS Hospital,

Okubo,

Anderton,
806

797 P.2d 1117

790 P.2d 94 (Utah App.

831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Newsom

v.

779 P.2d 692 (Utah App. 1989); .Reeves
Inc.,

764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988);

763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988);
Center,

Intermountain
v.

v.

grounds,

v.
612 P.2d 348

v.

Hicken,

Pemberton,

v.

(Utah 1980); Marsh
v.

v.

Virginia

S.

741 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1987);
Health

Intermountain

Care,

Health

(Utah App. 1987).
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740 P.2d 240 (Utah App.
Care Inc.,

740 P.2d 262

Till!
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The issues presented by medical malpractice cases generally
involve medical questions and medica

udgments beyond the

1

Searle

Pharmaceuticals

Pemberton,

lac,

s'upra.

^- stated \r Marsh v.

supra:
It is seldom that a doctor's standard of
care, because it is so specialized, is known
or is within the knowledge of a layman. We
believe this case to be the type that
required expert testimony as to a standard of
care and that the fa I lure of the plaintiff to
call an expert medical witness and establish
such a standard was fatal to his recovery.
. \:..>..

3 :i I I • 2: ::i a t: II II II 1
testimony, \*x finder

^ assistance

* 'a-* whether

expert medical
; ?*-- oi vary, is

impermissil:
conjecture ^

. ...v standard

—

* as required

Defendant and whether :i Il: \ /as met. Marsh •
Anderson

l i i: • •

Hoopiiaiana

\

I ::• I I J I ., .1 I 2 1 2 62

Intermountain

»f the

Emberton, Id. ;
> 2 ::: (111 S 13) ;

1 3s

Health Care 1 i ic,, supra.

In the present case, the trial coin: t correct] y relied upon
the testi irit ::H i;;

:::: -f exper t

; :i t:i lesses t :::: • I =t = r mi i I = \ /I: l a t:

of car e was by which Di , Wilde's conduct would be measured. Aii
of the expert witnesses, including the Plaintiff
that

;

accepted by competent and q:^iified obstetricians
similar communities throughoi 1 •

country

t
found

-vn agreed

I

e standard
i:- v.est J m^n1. •

:

zed • = .i I

tnis and

»-v,.e extent that
. r^re, the Cour t

equivocal, unpersuasive and lacking i 11
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credibility."

[Finding No. 8.]

The trial court also

specifically concluded that the Appellant's arguments and
proffered evidence that the school of thought Dr. Wilde followed
was unaccepted, insufficient or unsafe were unpersuasive.
[Finding No. 11.]

As discussed elsewhere in this brief, those

Findings are fully supported by the evidence.
The Appellant now urges this Court to judicially create its
own standard of care for physicians that is different from the
one the trial court found to be an appropriate and safe standard
practiced by the majority of competent, careful and knowledgeable
obstetricians in this community and around the country.

In

short, Appellant asks this Court to overturn decades of wellestablished case law and to substitute its Judgment for that of
the medical community in determining how to appropriately
diagnose and treat a medical complication of pregnancy.

The

Court should decline the invitation.
The issue in this case is not, as the Appellant contends,
whether or not the finder of fact is required to accept as the
standard of care, a parochial or antiquated practice simply
because it is followed by some practitioners.
Lamb,

584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978), Vassos

768 (Wyo. 1981), United

Blood

Services

Unlike Swan v.

v. Roussalis,
v.

Quintana,

625 P.2d
827 P.2d 509

(Colo. 1992), and other cases cited in the Appellant's brief, the
trial court admitted into evidence all of the experts' opinions
on what constituted the appropriate standard of care.

On the

basis of the expert testimony and authoritative literature he
- 21 -

*

found

. i

!

conformed Lw ,. . accepted, safe and appropriate standard

^

What the Appellant really advocates is a form of strict
:::

basis

The Appellant

. i^u rfould permit judges and juries

r,,

:reate standards of t:<\i-

tron the:*

">w

xpectations

: •

experts.

1

Ir i support of thi s proposition, the Appellant relies

upon an obscure and discredited decision, Helling
I .2- i 983

( If I

In Helling

1

v

Carey,

519

.Il S ; I) .
the Washington Court reached the remarkable

conclusion that :i t was appropriate for the Court to

expectations of medicine regardless : i t.h<
opini on to the contrary

onsensus of medical

J ustice utter xn a concurring opinion

observ ed:
It seem [sic] to me we are i n reality ,
imposing liability, because, in choosing
between an innocent plaintiff and a doctor,
who acted reasonably according to his
specialty but could have prevented the full
effects of this disease by administering a
simple, harmless test and treatment, the
plaintiff should not have to bear the risk of
loss. As such, imposition of liability
approaches that of strict liabili ty

The concept of 1 io] ci i i lg a physic I ai I who acted reasonably
according *

court

specialty strictly liable

-u^t , • . *..

liat le without

J, ,K i , . « jeuLbiui; Wds released, the
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Utah Supreme Court and this Court have had no fewer than 21
opportunities to review the long-standing tradition that
physicians in this state are liable only for injuries proximately
caused by a departure from the accepted standard of care of the
profession in this and similar communities.
pp. 18 - 20.]

[Appellee's Brief

In every instance, the courts have reaffirmed the

legal standard the trial court used in this case.

The

Helling

decision has never been cited in any Utah decision and it has
remained in its appropriate place of obscurity in American
jurisprudence.
Irvin

Memorial

Properly so.
Blood

Bank,

As the court observed in Osborn

v.

5 Cal. App. 4th 234, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d

101 (Ct. App. 1992) about the Helling

decision, which it refused

to follow:
Most of the commentary on this case has been
unfavorable. A contemporary observer wrote
that the Helling court had "unwisely . . .
arrogated to itself medical decisions,
superimposing its medical judgment upon the
collective experience of the medical
profession. Can it really be said that the
medical judgments of the courts will be
'right' more often than those guided by
proved medical practices?" (Citing
King,
In
Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical
Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula
(1975) 28 Vand. L. Rev. 1213, 1250; and
Keeton,
Medical Negligence — the Standard of
Care (1979) 10 Texas Tech L. Rev. 351, 367 8).
5 Cal. App. 4th at 279.

The court also noted that Helling

is at

odds with the underlying judicial philosophy, which the Utah
courts certainly share, of deference to another learned
profession:

- 23 -

The basic reason why professionals are
usually held only to a standard of custom and
practice is that their informed approach to
matters outside common knowledge should not
be "evaluated by the ad hoc judgments of a
lay judge or lay jurors aided by hindsight"
(citation omitted). In the words of a
leading authority, "When it can be said that
the collective wisdom of the profession is
that a particular course of action is the
desirable course, then it would seem that the
collective wisdom should be followed by the
courts." (Citing Keeton, supra, 10 Texas
Tech L. Rev. at pp. 3 64 - 3 65.)

Although Helling
State

in an emaciated form continues
-•-*.-. fr H~H » . **

Washingtc

J

haunt the

;>^r^:^tion where a
-.; _

unnn a

physician whose diagnosis and treatment were consistent with the
standard of c a m practiced both locally and nati onally.
ashington, the courts have retreated from H elli ng

Even
and, as ^

. .-..; :v. / interpreted, :i t would have no application to

the fact- • ' ins c a s e in
.LIlj"li( l.

a n y e^ rent.

li: i !" I = • = • I :s i

1 1 a r .:: : 55 0 I 2 1

^..^h App. 1 976), the court concluded that the

Helling

holding "was intended to be r estricted solely to i ts owi I #i mi q u e '
facts, !If £ = •
Overlake

f a :i 1 \ lr e t ::: • test for ! jl a/i ::ic: ::: m c

Hospital

the cour- . .

Medical

Center,

Ii :i I I :f :: ha r d s t

; 96 P. 2d 3 3 7 (Wash. App. 1990)

.-.':-., n Dtwithstanding, expert testimony

i s !, I in I
"reasonably pruden

u u n nei.,.

The standard of care against whicl i a health
care provider is judged is generally
established by expert testimony. This
requirement has evolved to a standard of
reasonably prudent medical care, Reasonably
- 24 -

prudent medical care is not within the
knowledge of lay persons. Thus, although the
standard of care is not restricted to what is
actually practiced, it must be determined by
reference to expert testimony as to what is
reasonably prudent. Contrary
to
the

[plaintiff's]
argument, the law does not
permit a jury to base a standard of care on
what it believes
to be a prudent
expectation
of society or
patients.
Richards

v. Overlake

Hospital

Medical Center,

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Holy

Family

Hospital,

Id.

at 744 - 745

In addition, in Keogan

v.

622 P.2d 1246, 1259 (Wash. 1980) the

Washington Supreme Court emphasized that:
This court has never adopted a standard of
care that would always require a physician to
always rule out potentially fatal causes of
symptoms before proceeding with treatment,
regardless of the standard of care in the
medical community; the evidence in this case
does not support such a holding as a matter
of law. A wrong diagnosis is not in itself
negligence.
In this case, the expert testimony the trial court found to
be credible established that the standard of care Dr. Wilde
followed was well-supported in the medical literature and by
competent and qualified experts as an approved method of
diagnosis and treatment recommended and followed by specialists
in obstetrics.

[Finding No. 11.]

The court also specifically

found that there was no reason to believe that the standard of
care Dr. Wilde followed was in any way unaccepted, insufficient
or unsafe.

[Id.]

testimony.

Neither it nor a jury should be permitted to "base a

The trial court appropriately relied on expert

standard of care on what it believes to be a prudent expectation
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ever*
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suggests that such a practice ot repeating blood pressure
measurements would be "simple, »a?" harmless, inexpensive and

* -a . terature, 73% of a]1 women during

According •
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f pregnancy.

Mrs, R:i ver a 1 lad no proteinuria, her

headaches, nausea and vomiting, even in her own expert's opinion,
wore :rr<">lated Lu " rr-eclampsia and bhe had some swe] II i in | nl IHM
. . h oncur.q

. ;

48; Dr. Wilde :
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indistinguishab

*

standarc

.

pregnancies,
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••;.>. •> words, Mrs. Rivera was
e

^ui *. required roonitui jii^ Mia. r i vera every six hours

for the last _A months _i __„i pregnancy, u^_ other physicians

would be obliged to do so as well for 75% of their patients who
would fall in this category.

According to the Appellant's

statistics, if there are approximately 36,000 live births in Utah
each year [Appellant's Brief p. 22.], 27,000 of them would
require the intensive monitoring the Appellant insists should be
the standard of care as a matter of law.
would be staggering.

The burden of doing so

Meanwhile, it is undisputed that the risk

of an eclamptic seizure, such as Mrs. Rivera experienced, before
the 28th week of pregnancy is extremely remote -— between 1 in
30,000 and 1 in 100,000.

[Dr. Wilde R. 1290.]

In other words,

an eclamptic seizure like Mrs. Rivera's occurs once every one to
three years in Utah.

These statistics, combined with the fact

that eclampsia cannot always be detected, treated or prevented
regardless of the intensity of surveillance, demonstrate that any
alleged benefit of the Appellant's standard is overwhelmed by the
burden it would impose on Utah's obstetricians and obstetrical
patients.
Mrs. Rivera's definition of pre-eclampsia and argument for
following Helling

v.

Carey

reflect her attempt to persuade this

Court to adopt strict liability in medical malpractice cases.
Indeed, Mrs. Rivera attempts to define negligence by the fact of
her disease, arguing that her "eclamptic seizures and stroke-like
condition are proof positive of an unsafe standard."
[Appellant's Brief p. 32.]

Mrs. Rivera's position, however, is

at odds with well-established Utah law.

"The law is clear that

an undesired complication or result from medical treatment does
- 27 -
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CONCLUSION
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considered

evidence tm* parties offered

their r e s p e c t : " f

r-^jti''-

:n

support :t

4

^ - evaluating the credibility ui

tl IJIIE ¥ :i tnesses

\ :

additional study of the materials before /
adopted Findings based upon thr evidence

i on \jpnn ^nH
Juciq- Murphy
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ai id persuasive.

The Appellant has failed to demonstrate any

valid reason \*-

t.his Court should conclude that the trial

court
Rather than marshaling the evidence as she is required to
do,

the Appellant merely recites ad nauseam

should reject them cis

'

n it i >s LI- \

the same arguments

^\ judge's role, ~*"

this Court's, to weigh the evidence which, _:: this case, amply
s

I

•• 9 .

Having no factual basis iu reverse the lower court, the
Appellant argues that this Court

:,houl.i

I J Il , .1

erphysicians,

jettison decades of

:•• lega* precedent

icr such a proposition is as

discredited and misguided as the premise upon whicn n is based.
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As much as the Appellant would like to ignore expert medical
opinion and retrospectively create her own personalized standard
of care to impose upon the medical community, the courts of this
State have wisely chosen to avoid such hubris.

The trial court

appropriately relied upon competent expert testimony to ascertain
the prevailing and appropriate standard of care by which to
measure Dr. Wilde's conduct.

It was clearly not error to do so.

We respectfully ask the Court to affirm the Judgment of the
court below.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ir*4

\H

day of February, 1994.

WILLIAMS & HUNT

By:

<fa

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
BRUckJil-

JENSEN

Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee
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ADDENDUM
i.

i

2.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment

Tabl

]

UTAH RU LES OF CI V IL PROCEDURE

the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 52. F i n d i n g s by t h e c o u r t .
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court
may amend its findings or make additional findings
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a
motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties
to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the
trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in
the minutes.
(Amended effective J a n . 1, 1987.)
Rule 53. M a s t e r s .
(a) Appointment a n d c o m p e n s a t i o n . Any or all
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this
rule. As used in these rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the
parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the
action, which is in the custody and control of the
court as the court may direct. The master shall not
retain his report as security for his compensation; but
when the party ordered to pay the compensation allowed by the court does not pay it after notice and
within the time prescribed by the court, the master is
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entitled to a writ of execution against the delinquent
party.
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the
exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues
are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury,
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition
requires it.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only
and may fix the time and place for beginning and
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's
report. Subject to the specifications and limitations
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may require
the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by
the order of reference and has the authority to put
witnesses on oath and may himself examine them
and may call the parties to the action and examine
them upon oath. When a party so requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and
excluded in the same manner and subject to the same
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence
for a court sitting without a jury.
(d) Proceedings.
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise
provides, the master shall forthwith set a time
and place for the first meeting of the parties or
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after
the date of the order of reference and shall notify
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence.
Either party, on notice to the parties and master,
may apply to the court for an order requiring the
master to speed the proceedings and to make his
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a
future day, giving notice to the absent party of
the adjournment.
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the
attendance of witnesses before the master by the
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided
in Rules 37 and 45.
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of
accounting are in issue before the master, he
may prescribe the form in~ which the accounts
shall be submitted and in any proper case may
require or receive in evidence a statement by a
certified public accountant who is called as a witness. Upon objection of a party to any of the
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the
form of statement is insufficient, the master may
require a different form of statement to be fur-
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 900902630
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Judge Michael R. Murphy
Defendant•
ANTONIO R. RIVERA, by and
through his Guardian Ad Litem
TONY RIVERA, also known as
Antonio R. Rivera,
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Plaintiff,
v.
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.E
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter
the Honorable Michael
entitled court

Murphy, one of tl, judges

-he 22nd day

* Septembei

199.

~he abovePlaintiff

Brenda
her attorneys of record, .Robert B. Sykes, James D

y" :ii los and

Tamara J. Hauge of and for Sykes & Vilos, Defendant having been

present in person and represented by his attorneys of record,
Elliott J. Williams and Bruce H. Jensen of and for Williams &
Hunt, the Court having received the Stipulation of the parties
that the claims of Plaintiff Antonio R. Rivera shall be decided,
as to a finding of liability, upon the evidence presented and the
judgment of the Court as to the claims of Plaintiff Brenda
Rivera, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having
reviewed the exhibits entered into evidence, having heard the
arguments of counsel, having considered proposed findings and
conclusions submitted by the parties and the memoranda of counsel
submitted therewith, and with good cause appearing therefore,
does now enter its:
FINDINGS OP PACT
1.

In early February 1989, Plaintiff Brenda Rivera sought

the services of Defendant, a specialist in obstetrics and
gynecology, to care for her in conjunction with her first
pregnancy.
2.

At the time, Plaintiff was 25 years old.

At the time of Plaintiff's first pre-natal visit to

Defendant on March 1, 1989, Defendant determined on the basis of
Plaintiff's medical and family history and physical examination
that she was a low risk obstetrical patient, that the estimated
gestational age of the fetus was 11 % weeks, and that the
estimated date of confinement (for delivery) was September 17,
1989.

Defendant provided information to Plaintiff and her

husband about what they could expect during the pregnancy and
assured them that they could, and should, call him anytime they
- 2 -

had any concerns or problems.

During her pregnancy, Plaintiff

had the following blood pressure and weights at the times
indicated
Date

Weeks

Weight

3/1/89
4/24/89
5/22/89

11%
19
24-5

157
170
173

6/15/89

26

181

B.P. (Systolic/
Diastolic)
98/64
110/72
120/68
ML10/88
110/84
LllO/80

3.

Plaintiff was seen monthly by Defendant for routine pre-

natal care. During these visits she complained to Defendant about
persistent headaches, which were relieved with Tylenol, and
nausea and vomiting.

These symptoms are common during pregnancy

and Defendant reassured Plaintiff and her husband that she should
soon begin to feel better.
4.

On June 12, 1989, Plaintiff's husband spoke with

Defendant's nurse by telephone and reported that Plaintiff was
experiencing some swelling in her feet and legs after being on
them all day.

After questioning him about other complaints and

learning of none, the nurse recommended that Plaintiff elevate
her legs as much as possible and increase her water intake.

If

her condition worsened she was to come in before her next
scheduled visit.
5.

When Plaintiff visited Defendant on her next scheduled

visit on June 15, 1989, the estimated gestational age of the
fetus was 26 weeks.

Plaintiff's blood pressure was measured as

110/88 and a urine test revealed no protein in her urine.
- 3 -

Defendant repeated the blood pressure measurement, which was
found to be 110/84, and rechecked the urine specimen to confirm
the absence of proteinuria.
6.

During that visit, Plaintiff repeated her complaints of

having headaches, which were still relieved with Tylenol, and
some nausea and vomiting.

She also complained of some fatigue.

The symptoms of which Plaintiff complained were consistent with a
flu-like illness that many of Defendant's patients had recently
reported.

At the request of the Plaintiff's husband, Defendant

also carefully examined Plaintiff's feet, ankles, legs and face
and found no pathologic edema.

Defendant instructed Plaintiff to

take breaks at work so that she could have her legs elevated, to
rest and keep off her feet when at home and to take care of
herself.

Defendant told Plaintiff that she should start feeling

better in a few days, but, if she did not or got worse, she
should come in to be checked.

Defendant asked Plaintiff to come

back for another pre-natal visit in two weeks, rather than at the
regular interval of one month.

Plaintiff's blood pressure was

taken a third time and was measured at 110/80. During this
office visit the Defendant considered the possibility of preeclampsia and upon examination and evaluation ruled out the
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia in accordance with the accepted school
of thought to which he adhered.
7.
1989.

Plaintiff experienced an eclamptic seizure on June 23,

She had no contact with Defendant between the time of the

last office visit on June 15, 1989, and the eclamptic seizure.
- 4 -

8.

Plaintiff and Defendant called expert witnesses to

provide testimony in support of their respective positions.

The

Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Maclyn Wade, had limited obstetrical
experience and his testimony was equivocal, unpersuasive and
lacking in credibility.

Dr. Wade gave away on cross-examination

most of the points he made on direct and redirect examination.
9.

The expert testimony adduced during trial and the

medical literature to which reference was made by the witnesses
clearly established that there is no uniform standard of care
followed by all competent practitioners, but rather a cacophony
of opinion, on the subject of the criteria for diagnosing preeclampsia.
10.

Based upon the expert testimony and medical literature

presented, the Court finds that Defendant's treatment of
Plaintiff complied with an acceptable school of thought which is
within the standard of care.

It was appropriate for Defendant to

adopt and adhere to the school of thought that:

(1) defines pre-

eclampsia as a blood pressure of equal to or greater than 140/90
in the presence of proteinuria; and (2) considers edema (even of
the face and hands) and weight gain as so common in pregnancy
that they are useless for the diagnosis of pre-eclampsia.
11.

The school of thought Defendant followed in his

diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff is well-supported in the
medical literature and by competent and qualified experts as an
approved method of diagnosis and treatment recommended and
followed by a respectable portion of the medical community in the
- 5 -

specialty of obstetrics and gynecology.

The Plaintiff has not

demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence with credible
expert testimony that the school of thought Defendant followed is
unaccepted, insufficient or unsafe.
12.

During Defendant's examination and evaluation of

Plaintiff on June 15, 1989, the possibility of pre-eclampsia was
raised, but there was nothing in Plaintiff's medical or family
history, course of pregnancy, complaints, or examination and test
findings which was diagnostic of pre-eclampsia or developing preeclampsia.

To the contrary, Plaintiff did not have hypertension

or proteinuria.

Her symptoms of headache, nausea, and vomiting

were not caused by pre-eclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia.
The amount of edema and weight gain observed was not unusual.
Moreover, the risk of pre-eclampsia and/or eclampsia is extremely
low in gravid patients at 26 weeks gestational age.
13.

Defendant acted appropriately on June 15, 1989, in

changing his usual procedure and instructing Plaintiff to return
in two weeks rather than the usual four week interval.

The

standard of care did not require Defendant to take any further
action or to have the patient return sooner than two weeks.
14.

Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof to

establish a claim for medical malpractice or negligence against
Defendant and the more credible evidence received convinces the
Court that Defendant clearly complied with an applicable and
acceptable standard of medical care in his treatment and care of
Plaintiff during her pregnancy.
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15.

Plaintiff suffered eclamptic seizures on June 23, 1989.

The eclampsia caused Plaintiff physical and mental injuries.

The

Court makes no findings on the categories or items of damage.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In order to recover upon a claim for medical

malpractice, Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that Defendant deviated from the
standard of care applicable to physicians specializing in
obstetrics and gynecology practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah, or
similar communities, in 1989, and that said deviation from the
standard of care was a proximate cause of the injuries and
damages claimed by Plaintiff.
2.

Plaintiff Brenda Rivera has failed to meet her burden of

proof on the elements of her medical malpractice claim against
Defendant and Defendant is therefore entitled to a judgment in
his favor of no cause of action upon the claims of Plaintiff
Brenda Rivera and, based upon the Stipulation of the parties
herein, and with good cause appearing, is further entitled to a
judgment in his favor of no cause of action upon the claims of
Plaintiff Antonio R. Rivera.
5.

Defendant is entitled to be awarded his Court costs

incurred herein.
DATED this

day of

U^~*' BY THE COURT:

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Court Judge
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
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WILLIAMS 6 HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Clayton S. Wilde, M.D.
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRENDA RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D.,
Defendant.
ANTONIO R. RIVERA, by and
through his Guardian Ad Litem
TONY RIVERA, also known as
Antonio R. Rivera,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 900902630
Judge Michael R. Murphy

:
:
:
:
:

v.

:

CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D.,

:

Defendant.

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Civil No. 910907496

:

The above-entitled matter having come on for trial before
the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, one of the judges of the aboveentitled Court, on the 22nd day of September, 1992, Plaintiff
having been present in person and represented by her attorneys of
record, Robert B. Sykes, James D. Vilos and Tamara J. Hauge of
and for Sykes & Vilos, and Defendant having been present in

person and represented by his attorneys, Elliott J. Williams and
Bruce H. Jensen of and for Williams & Hunt, the Court having
received the stipulations of the parties, having heard the
testimony of the witnesses, having reviewed the exhibits entered
into evidence, having heard the arguments of counsel, and now
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
with good cause appearing therefore,
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of Defendant and against
Plaintiffs Brenda Rivera and Antonio R. Rivera, no cause of
action, with costs awarded to Defendant in the amount of $3,284.
DATED this

day of

Us-*-*—
BY THE COURT:

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RO
T.
Attorneys
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, 1993.

